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Police, legal professionals, and lay persons generally consider confessions 
to be convincing evidence of guilt.1  Many confessions are truthful, but 
there is ample evidence that at least some confessions are false.  The 
actual rate of false confessions is not known.  However, there is a growing 
number of United States studies examining proven and probable cases of 
 * Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Western Ontario. 
 1. See Smith v. The Queen, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 368, 389.  Psychological research 
confirms the compelling nature of confession evidence.  See Saul M. Kassin & Katherine 
Neumann, On the Power of Confession Evidence: An Experimental Test of the 
Fundamental Difference Hypothesis, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 469, 469 (1997).  It also 
suggests that knowledge that the confession was coerced does not alter the damning 
nature of such evidence.  See Saul M. Kassin & Holly Sukel, Coerced Confessions and 
the Jury: An Experimental Test of the “Harmless Error” Rule, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 
27, 27 (1997). 




wrongful convictions, and the more recent studies have attempted to 
identify and quantify the various factors that contributed to the conviction.  
These studies reveal that false confessions played an important role in 
the wrongful conviction in approximately fourteen to twenty-five percent of 
the cases examined.2  Unfortunately, there have been no similar attempts 
in either Canada or the United Kingdom to systematically identify and 
quantify the factors that have contributed to the known wrongful 
convictions in these jurisdictions. 
Surprisingly, even when a confession is false, many accused will either 
plead guilty, or contest the case and be convicted at trial.3  This situation 
is improving because false confessions are increasingly being revealed 
prior to trial as a result of early DNA testing.4  However, even when 
there is early exposure of a false confession, the individual involved 
often still endures significant liberty and other deprivations as a result of 
making the false confession.5  Innocent individuals falsely confess to 
committing crimes for many reasons.6  An expanding body of research7 
indicates that two of the main factors are the personal characteristics of 
the individual, and the interrogation methods that the police use on the 
individual, including the actual conditions of interrogation and detention.8
In R. v. Oickle, the Supreme Court of Canada expressly stated that the 
Canadian confessions rule “should recognize which interrogation techniques 
commonly produce false confessions so as to avoid miscarriages of 
justice.”9  As a result, the Court reformulated the traditional confessions 
rule in an attempt to better protect against false confessions.  An obvious 
question is whether the Court succeeded in attaining this goal.  An 
 2. Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the 
Post-DNA World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 891, 901–07 (2004). 
 3. See Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions: 
Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of Psychological 
Interrogation, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429, 477–85 (1998) [hereinafter Leo & 
Ofshe, Consequences];  Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The Truth About False 
Confessions and Advocacy Scholarship, 37 CRIM. L. BULL. 293, 306–10 (2001); Drizin 
& Leo, supra note 2, at 921–23, 961–62. 
 4. Drizin & Leo, supra note 2, at 900, 950–53. 
 5. Leo & Ofshe, Consequences, supra note 3, at 472; Drizin & Leo, supra note 2, 
at 900, 949–55. 
 6. For a review of the literature on the psychological basis for false confessions, 
see GISLI H. GUDJONSSON, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS: A 
HANDBOOK 193–215 (2003). 
 7. I refer to this research throughout this Article.  For a recent excellent summary 
of much of the psychological research and its implications, see generally Saul M. Kassin 
& Gisli H. Gudjonsson, The Psychology of Confessions: A Review of the Literature and 
Issues, 5 PSYCHOL. SCI. IN PUB. INT. 33 (2004). 
 8. Id. at 51, 53.  A further factor is the nature of the offense.  See GUDJONSSON, 
supra note 6, at 146–48. 
 9. [2000] 2 S.C.R. 3, 25. 
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examination of the reformulated rule indicates that, viewed in the abstract 
and measured against the current state of knowledge on false confessions, 
the modern rule does offer considerable protection to innocent persons, 
but it also has some significant shortcomings.  Additional reforms are 
necessary to further reduce the risk of false confessions.  These reforms 
should include greater judicial recognition of the individual risk factors 
associated with false confessions, mandatory videotaping of interrogation, 
and direct regulation of particular interrogation tactics.  The Court should 
also consider incorporating a post-confession reliability analysis into the 
modern confessions rule. 
I.  THE CONFESSIONS RULE 
The Canadian confessions rule excludes any statement that an accused 
makes to a person in authority, unless the Crown proves beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the accused made the statement voluntarily.  
Traditionally, courts would only find that a statement was involuntary if 
it had been obtained by “fear of prejudice or hope of advantage” or, in 
modern terms, by inducements in the form of threats or promises.10  The 
rule was eventually expanded to exclude statements that were not the 
product of an “operating mind,” because accused persons did not know 
what they were saying, or that the statement could be used to their 
detriment,11 as well as statements obtained through an interrogation 
conducted in an oppressive manner.12  There was also some suggestion 
in the case law, which never received full Supreme Court approval, that 
a statement could be excluded if the police had engaged in a form of 
trickery that shocked the conscience of Canadians.13  However, the 
courts tended to treat each of these actual or potential branches of the 
rule as independent grounds of exclusion: a violation of a specific 
branch of the rule usually had to be shown to exclude an accused 
person’s statement.14
As reformulated in Oickle, the trial judge may rule a statement 
involuntary if it was obtained by an inducement, the lack of an operating 
 10. Prosko v. The King, [1922] 63 S.C.R. 226, 229–30 (adopting Ibrahim v. The 
King, [1914] A.C. 599, 609 (P.C.) (appeal taken from H.K.)). 
 11. Ward v. The Queen, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 30, 40; Horvath v. The Queen, [1979] 2 
S.C.R. 376, 392; R. v. Whittle, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 914, 939. 
 12. Hobbins v. The Queen, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 553, 556–57. 
 13. Rothman v. The Queen, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 640, 697 (Lamer, J., concurring). 
 14. See Oickle, [2000] 2 S.C.R. at 22–23, 25, 44. 




mind, oppression, or a combination of any these circumstances.15  The 
modern inquiry into voluntariness thus requires an assessment of the 
totality of the circumstances—a trial judge must consider all aspects of 
the rule to determine whether the various aspects, either alone or in 
combination, raise a reasonable doubt as to the voluntariness of the 
statement.16  A contextual approach is explicitly mandated, one which 
generally eschews hard and fast rules.17  If there is a reasonable doubt 
that a statement is voluntary, it must be excluded.18  In addition to this 
contextual analysis, a statement will be excluded as involuntary if the 
police obtained the statement through trickery that shocks the conscience 
of Canadians.19  Police trickery is therefore recognized as a distinct 
branch of the voluntariness inquiry.20
II.  FALSE CONFESSIONS RESEARCH AND THE REFORMULATED RULE 
The likelihood of an innocent individual falsely confessing to a crime 
varies depending on a host of considerations.  The two main considerations 
are the personal characteristics of the individual and the interrogation 
methods that the police use on the individual, including the actual 
conditions of interrogation and detention.21  An examination of the modern 
rule as set out in Oickle, in light of the current state of psychological and 
legal knowledge on the causes of false confessions, indicates that the 
modern rule offers considerable protection to innocent persons, but it 
also has some significant shortcomings. 
A.  Problematic Suspects 
False confession researchers have identified certain categories of 
individuals who are more likely than others to make false confessions.  
These categories include individuals with intellectual disabilities,22 
 15. Id. at 42–43.  The Court recently reaffirmed the approach set out in Oickle.  
See R. v. Spencer, 2007 S.C.C. 11, 217 C.C.C. (3d) 353, 358–59 (2007). 
 16. See Oickle, [2000] 2 S.C.R. at 31. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 25. 
 19. Id. at 42. 
 20. Id. at 41. 
 21. See Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra note 7, at 51–53 (personal characteristics), 
53–55 (situational factors). 
 22. WELSH S. WHITE, MIRANDA’S WANING PROTECTIONS: POLICE INTERROGATION 
PRACTICES AFTER DICKERSON 201–03 (2001) [hereinafter WHITE, MIRANDA’S WANING 
PROTECTIONS]; Drizin & Leo, supra note 2, at 970–73; Paul T. Hourihan, Earl Washington’s 
Confession: Mental Retardation and the Law of Confessions, 81 VA. L. REV. 1471, 
1491–94 (1995); Welsh S. White, Confessions in Capital Cases, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 
979, 989–90, 995–1002 (2003) [hereinafter White, Capital Cases]; Welsh S. White, 
Miranda’s Failure to Restrain Pernicious Interrogation Practices, 99 MICH. L. REV. 
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individuals with mental illnesses,23 young persons,24 and individuals with 
compliant or suggestible personalities.25  Not every individual who falls 
within one of these categories is equally prone to making a false confession; 
however, in cases involving such individuals there should be careful 
scrutiny of their personal characteristics in order to identify and evaluate 
the degree of vulnerability that is present.26
Individuals with intellectual disabilities are considered problematic 
suspects because they are often particularly susceptible to pressure and 
coercion, and are highly suggestible and eager to please authority 
figures.27  They may also fail to appreciate the long-term consequences 
of their statements or actions.  These two attributes, when coupled with 
police interrogation techniques that make it clear to the individual that 
the interrogator wants a statement, may induce an innocent, intellectually 
disabled individual to falsely confess to a crime.  Indeed, individuals 
with intellectual disabilities may have difficulty coping with “even the 
average level of stress built into an interrogation . . . .”28  Young persons 
are considered problematic suspects for many of the same reasons.  They 
do not yet have fully developed intellectual capacities, they often wish to 
please authority figures, and they may not fully appreciate the long-term 
consequences of making a false confession.29  Moreover, the younger the 
1211, 1232 (2001) [hereinafter White, Miranda’s Failure]; Welsh S. White, What is an 
Involuntary Confession Now?, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 2001, 2044–46 (1998) [hereinafter 
White, Involuntary Now]. 
 23. GISLI H. GUDJONSSON, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERROGATIONS, CONFESSIONS 
AND TESTIMONY 284–86 (1992); Drizin & Leo, supra note 2, at 973–74; Kassin & 
Gudjonsson, supra note 7, at 53.  Further research is required to ascertain the risk factors 
associated with specific mental disorders.  For a summary of how various mental 
disorders may increase an individual’s risk of making a false confession, see Deborah 
Davis & William T. O’Donohue, The Road to Perdition: Extreme Influence Tactics in 
the Interrogation Room, in HANDBOOK OF FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY: RESOURCE FOR 
MENTAL HEALTH AND LEGAL PROFESSIONALS  897, 963–67 (William T. O’Donahue & 
Eric R. Levensky eds., 2004). 
 24. GUDJONSSON, supra note 6, at 141–43; Drizin & Leo, supra note 2, at 944–45, 
963, 968–69; White, Miranda’s Failure, supra note 22, at 1232. 
 25. GUDJONSSON, supra note 23, at 142–62; Welsh S. White, False Confessions 
and the Constitution: Safeguards Against Untrustworthy Confessions, 32 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 105, 120 (1997). 
 26. See White, supra note 25, at 121. 
 27. GUDJONSSON, supra note 23, at 284–86; Morgan Cloud et al., Words Without 
Meaning: The Constitution, Confessions, and Mentally Retarded Suspects, 69 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 495, 511–14 (2002); White, supra note 25, at 118–23. 
 28. WHITE, MIRANDA’S WANING PROTECTIONS, supra note 22, at 202. 
 29. Steven A. Drizin & Beth A. Colgan, Tales from the Juvenile Front: A Guide to 
How Standard Police Interrogation Tactics Can Produce Coerced and False Confessions 




children, the greater the risk that they will succumb to the pressures of 
interrogation and make a false confession.30
Individuals with compliant personalities exhibit two key personality 
traits.  First, they wish to please and they need to protect their self-esteem 
when interacting with other people.  Second, they try to avoid conflict and 
confrontation with other people, especially authority figures.31  Compliant 
individuals, therefore, will generally wish to agree with the interrogator 
even if it means agreeing to a version of facts that differs from their own 
recollection of the events, particularly if the interrogator emphasizes 
certainty in the individual’s guilt.32   
Suggestible individuals also appear to be more prone to making false 
confessions.33  Interrogative suggestibility differs from compliance because 
it requires individuals to personally accept the information the interrogator 
communicates to them, while compliance merely requires agreement.34  
Various factors affect suggestibility, including low intelligence, age, 
poor memory, low self-esteem, lack of assertiveness, and anxiety.35  
Trusting individuals also tend to be more suggestible than suspicious 
individuals, as do sleep-deprived individuals and individuals who are 
withdrawing from alcohol or drugs.36
The modern confessions rule addresses the personal characteristics of 
the individual being interrogated in two respects.  First, the operating 
mind doctrine expressly requires that the individuals know what they are 
saying and know that the statement can be used to their detriment in 
from Juvenile Suspects, in INTERROGATIONS, CONFESSIONS, AND ENTRAPMENT 127, 130, 
157 (G. Daniel Lassiter ed., 2004); Allison D. Redlich et al., The Police Interrogation of 
Children and Adolescents, in INTERROGATIONS, CONFESSIONS, AND ENTRAPMENT, supra, at  
107, 109, 112–16. 
 30. See Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra note 7, at 52–53; Allison D. Redlich & Gail 
S. Goodman, Taking Responsibility for an Act Not Committed: The Influence of Age and 
Suggestibility, 27 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 141, 151–52 (2003). 
 31. Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra note 7, at 51. 
 32. White, supra note 25, at 124–25.  Psychologists use a compliance scale to 
measure an individual’s fear of authority and his or her eagerness to please.  There is a 
correlation between higher scale scores and the likelihood of making a false confession, 
but further research is necessary to establish the predictive validity of the scale.  See 
Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra note 7, at 51. 
 33. Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra note 7, at 51–52.  Suggestibility refers to the 
likelihood of the individual modifying his or her behavior as a result of accepting the 
messages that the police communicate to him or her during the course of the 
interrogation.  Id. 
 34. GUDJONSSON, supra note 23, at 137. 
 35. Gisli H. Gudjonsson, The Application of Interrogative Suggestibility to Police 
Interviewing, in HUMAN SUGGESTIBILITY: ADVANCES IN THEORY, RESEARCH AND 
APPLICATION 279, 282–83 (John F. Schumaker ed., 1991); Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra 
note 7, at 52. 
 36. R. v. Oickle, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 3, 29, 38–39. 
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court.37  However, this is an extremely low test of cognitive capacity.  
The doctrine will not generally operate on its own to exclude many 
confessions, even in cases involving vulnerable individuals.38  More 
important is the modern rule’s recognition that individual vulnerabilities 
that fall short of establishing a lack of an operating mind are still relevant 
factors in the overall assessment of voluntariness.  As the Supreme Court 
stated in Oickle, judges must “be sensitive to the particularities of the 
individual suspect.”39  The modern rule therefore allows judges to consider 
all personal characteristics of the individual, such as intellectual disability 
and age, as well as personality traits like compliance and suggestibility, 
all of which may not establish that the individual lacked an operating 
mind when making the statement.  It equally allows judges to consider 
incident-specific concerns including intoxication, alcohol or drug 
withdrawal, and sleep deprivation, which may intensify the vulnerability 
of an already vulnerable suspect or create vulnerabilities in an otherwise 
non-vulnerable suspect.40  This represents a significant advance over the 
previous law and its compartmentalized approach to the assessment of 
voluntariness. 
However, there is cause for concern in this area.  Most notably, the 
Court in Oickle does not discuss in any detail the types of personal 
characteristics and incident-specific concerns that lead to an enhanced 
risk of false confessions.  The Court’s only direct reference to this issue, 
drawing on the work of Professor White, is as follows: 
False confessions are particularly likely when the police interrogate particular 
types of suspects, including suspects who are especially vulnerable as a result of 
their background, special characteristics, or situation, suspects who have 
compliant personalities, and, in rare instances, suspects whose personalities 
make them prone to accept and believe police suggestions made during the 
course of the interrogation.41
The Court therefore fails to provide any real guidance to judges and 
counsel on this important issue. 
In addition, in its general discussion of the relationship between false 
confessions and police interrogation techniques, the Court makes some 
 37. Id. at 40. 
 38. See Christopher Sherrin, False Confessions and Admissions in Canadian Law, 
30 QUEEN’S L.J. 601,  639–56 (2005). 
 39. Oickle, [2000] 2 S.C.R. at 29. 
 40. See generally GUDJONSSON, supra note 6, at 389–90, 415–33 (discussing the 
effect of alcohol and drugs on suspect vulnerability). 
 41. Oickle, [2000] 2 S.C.R. at 29 (quoting White, supra note 25, at 120). 




comments that arguably undermine its recognition that the particular 
characteristics of the individual must always be kept in mind.  Drawing 
on the work of Professors Ofshe and Leo, the Court accepts that “[f]alse 
confessions are rarely the product of proper police techniques,”42 but 
rather “almost always involve ‘shoddy police practice and/or police 
criminality.’”43  It also accepts that “in most cases, ‘eliciting a false 
confession takes strong incentives, intense pressure and prolonged 
questioning.’”44  The Court’s ready acceptance of these comments is 
problematic because it ignores the work of other leading false confession 
researchers who have demonstrated the enhanced risk that exists for 
vulnerable individuals even when law enforcement uses proper interrogation 
techniques, as well as the thin line between legitimate and illegitimate 
interrogation techniques.  As Professors Kassin and Gudjonsson state, 
“[A]n individual may be so dispositionally naive, compliant, suggestible, 
delusional, anxious, or otherwise impaired that little interrogative 
pressure is required to produce a false confession.”45  Moreover, judges 
and counsel may be led astray by such comments and may fail to 
properly consider individual vulnerabilities in a particular case, because 
the police rely on interrogation strategies and techniques that either do 
not in the abstract appear particularly problematic, or do not rise to the 
level described by the Court.  Indeed, a recent review of the confessions 
case law suggests this is occurring.46  This is a significant shortcoming 
given that researchers have indicated that individual vulnerabilities are 
an important cause of false confessions.47
B.  Problematic Interrogation Strategies and Techniques 
The police have available to them a wide variety of legitimate and 
illegitimate interrogation strategies and techniques including using 
 42. Id. at 30. 
 43. Id. (quoting Leo & Ofshe, Consequences, supra note 3, at 492.) 
 44. Id. (quoting Richard J. Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, The Social Psychology of 
Police Interrogation: The Theory and Classification of True and False Confessions, 16 
STUD. IN L., POL. & SOC’Y 189, 193 (1997)). 
 45. Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra note 7, at 56.  The Court also ignores Ofshe and 
Leo’s own acknowledgement of this reality.  See Ofshe & Leo, supra note 44, at 192–93. 
 46. Sherrin, supra note 38.  Based on a review of the case law Sherrin concludes 
that “the confessions rule has not generally been interpreted or applied in a way that 
adequately takes [individual] vulnerabilities into account.”  Id. at 656. 
 47. See, e.g., Gisli H. Gudjonsson, Disputed Confessions and Miscarriages of 
Justice in Britain: Expert Psychological and Psychiatric Evidence in the Court of 
Appeal, 31 MANITOBA L.J. 489 (2006).  Gudjonsson examined thirty of the leading false 
confessions cases in Britain and found that in approximately two-thirds of the cases the 
primary cause of the false confession was the individual’s psychological vulnerability, 
not police misconduct.  Id. at 492. 
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threats and promises, flattering or sympathizing with the individual, 
sidestepping the individual’s denials and objections, minimizing the 
moral seriousness of the individual’s offense, exaggerating the strength 
of the evidence against the individual, and even relying on fabricated 
evidence.  In most cases, the police will utilize more than one technique 
during an interrogation, which can intensify the effect of an individual 
technique.48  Through their examination of interrogation strategies and 
techniques in individual cases, as well as psychological research, false 
confession researchers have identified several strategies and techniques 
that appear to have a greater likelihood of inducing individuals to falsely 
confess.  The strategies and techniques that have raised the most concern 
among researchers are third degree interrogation tactics, promises of 
leniency, threats of adverse consequences for third parties, police 
deception about the strength of the evidence in the case, and lengthy 
interrogations.49
It has long been recognized and accepted that third degree interrogation 
tactics, including both actual and threatened violence, have the potential 
to induce innocent individuals to falsely confess.50  The available 
research substantiates this view because a number of the proven and 
probable cases of false confessions involve the use of direct physical 
violence against the individual.51  Other types of explicit or implicit 
threats, such as threats of further charges or enhanced punishment, can 
also induce false confessions.52  Even a threat directed at a third party 
may induce an innocent individual to falsely confess if the individual has 
sufficient ties to the threatened third party—for example, a close friendship 
 48. White, Miranda’s Failure, supra note 22, at 1233. 
 49. See generally Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra note 7, at 53–55, 60; WHITE, 
MIRANDA’S WANING PROTECTIONS, supra note 22, at 204, 212; White, supra note 25, at 
143–53. 
 50. Ofshe & Leo, supra note 44, at 205–06.  For a description of the actual range 
of third degree techniques used to obtain confessions, see Drizin & Leo, supra note 2, at 
908–09. 
 51. LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN ET AL., PSYCHOLOGY AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 223 
(5th ed. 2002); Wayne T. Westling, Something is Rotten in the Interrogation Room: Let’s 
Try Video Oversight, 34 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 537, 543 (2001). 
 52. Ofshe & Leo, supra note 44, at 192; Richard J. Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, The 
Decision to Confess Falsely: Rational Choice and Irrational Action, 74 DENV. U. L. 
REV. 979, 1077–78, 1084–88 (1997) [hereinafter Ofshe & Leo, Decision to Confess]; 
White, Involuntary Now, supra note 22, at 2052.  These techniques are often referred to 
as maximization strategies.  See Saul M. Kassin & Karlyn McNall, Police Interrogations 
and Confessions: Communicating Promises and Threats by Pragmatic Implication, 15 
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 233, 234–35 (1991). 




or a family relationship—and the threat involves serious adverse 
consequences for that third party.53  In such circumstances, the individual 
may decide that shielding the other individual from harm must take 
precedence over trying to maintain innocence. 
Promises of leniency may also lead to a false confession, particularly 
where the promised leniency is significant.54  The promise need not be 
express.  Research indicates that implied promises of leniency, such as 
when the interrogator minimizes the individual’s legal culpability by 
suggesting that the individual was provoked or acted in self-defense or 
under the influence of alcohol or drugs, are almost as problematic as 
express promises of leniency because they can cause the individual to 
believe that a confession to such conduct will yield a more lenient 
sentence or no charges.55  However, the police are unlikely to induce an 
innocent individual, at least one who is not vulnerable in some way, to 
make a false confession if they only hold out some moderate or minimal 
benefit for the individual.56  As Ofshe and Leo state, “The psychological 
benefits of reducing guilt, doing the right thing, showing empathy for the 
victim’s family, straightening things out with God, and appearing honorable 
in the eyes of the investigator or the community are not likely to elicit a 
decision to confess from an innocent person . . . .”57  The following types 
of statements are, therefore, usually not problematic in themselves: 
“You’ll feel better after confessing”; “Confession is good for the soul”; 
or “Your family and friends will think better of you if you confess.”58
False confession researchers have also expressed considerable concern 
over the use of deceptive practices and, in particular, police deception 
 53. WHITE, MIRANDA’S WANING PROTECTIONS, supra note 22, at 210–11; Ofshe & 
Leo, Decision to Confess, supra note 52, at 1080–82; Ofshe & Leo, supra note 44, at 
229–30; White, Miranda’s Failure, supra note 22, at 1241–42. 
 54. WHITE, MIRANDA’S WANING PROTECTIONS, supra note 22, at 205–06; White, 
Involuntary Now, supra note 22, at 2050–52; White, Miranda’s Failure, supra note 22, at 
1234–36. 
 55. WHITE, MIRANDA’S WANING PROTECTIONS, supra note 22, at 205; Saul M. 
Kassin, A Critical Appraisal of Modern Police Interrogations, in INVESTIGATIVE 
INTERVIEWING: RIGHTS, RESEARCH AND REGULATION 207, 217 (Tom Williamson ed., 
2006); Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra note 7, at 55; Ofshe & Leo, supra note 44, at 204–
05; Ofshe & Leo, Decision to Confess, supra note 52, at 1088–89; White, Miranda’s 
Failure, supra note 22, at 1235–36.  See also Melissa B. Russano et al., Investigating 
True and False Confessions within a Novel Experimental Paradigm, 16 PSYCHOL. SCI. 
481, 484–86 (2005).  These techniques are often referred to as minimization strategies.  
See Kassin & McNall,  supra note 52, at 234–35. 
 56. WHITE, MIRANDA’S WANING PROTECTIONS, supra note 22, at 205; White, 
Miranda’s Failure, supra note 22, at 1234–35. 
 57. Ofshe & Leo, Decision to Confess, supra note 52, at 1060.  One reason for this 
is that the officer is asking the suspect to do the very thing that is prohibited by the 
cultural standards appealed to by the officer, namely, tell a lie. 
 58. White, Miranda’s Failure, supra note 22, at 1236. 
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about the strength of the evidence.59  This type of deception is designed 
to convince the individual that the police have conclusive evidence of 
the individual’s guilt, which research indicates increases the likelihood 
that an individual will confess.60  Moreover, research suggests that 
confronting innocent individuals with false evidence not only increases 
the risk of a false confession, it also increases the risk that the individuals 
will internalize a false belief in their guilt.61  Police deception about the 
strength of the case can take many forms.  The police may assert that the 
“case is cracked” or that the evidence “speaks for itself” as to the 
individual’s guilt.  They may exaggerate the strength of specific pieces 
of evidence, make up witnesses who will testify against the individual, 
assert that the individual has failed a polygraph test, or present fake 
forensic evidence.  The likelihood that these forms of deception will cause 
an individual to falsely confess depends on the personal characteristics 
of the individual and the specific tactic that the police employ. 
Most false confession researchers believe that the first form of 
deception—generally exaggerating the strength of the evidence or the 
interrogator’s belief in the individual’s guilt—is unlikely to lead to false 
confessions in the vast majority of cases.62  They also believe that most 
innocent individuals who are told there are witnesses who can testify as 
to their involvement in the crime will simply conclude the witness made 
an honest error or is lying,63 with the possible exception of cases where 
the police falsely inform the individual that someone has confessed and 
implicated the individual in the crime.64  In contrast, most researchers 
have concluded that the other forms of deception—using fake forensic 
evidence that purportedly establishes the individual’s guilt and, perhaps, 
 59. WHITE, MIRANDA’S WANING PROTECTIONS, supra note 22, at 211–14; Kassin, 
supra note 55, at 216–17; Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra note 7, at 54–55; White, 
Miranda’s Failure, supra note 22, at 1243. 
 60. See Stephen Moston et al., The Effects of Case Characteristics on Suspect 
Behaviour During Questioning, 32 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 23, 34 (1992). 
 61. Saul M. Kassin, On the Psychology of Confessions: Does Innocence Put 
Innocents at Risk?, 60 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 215, 221 (2005). 
 62. WHITE, MIRANDA’S WANING PROTECTIONS, supra note 22, at 211; White, 
Miranda’s Failure, supra note 22, at 1243. 
 63. WHITE, MIRANDA’S WANING PROTECTIONS, supra note 22, at 211; Ofshe & 
Leo, supra note 44, at 202; Ofshe & Leo, Decision to Confess, supra note 52, at 1017.  
But see White, Miranda’s Failure, supra note 22, at 1245 (noting that the force of the 
false eyewitness evidence could nonetheless convince an individual it was futile to 
continue to resist). 
 64. Drizin & Leo, supra note 2, at 976, 981; Ofshe & Leo, Decision to Confess, 
supra note 52, at 1018. 




falsifying polygraph results—may induce an innocent individual to 
falsely confess.65  In particular, this type of deception may be sufficient 
to convince suggestible or compliant innocent individuals that they are 
in fact guilty, or other less suggestible individuals that it is futile to 
continue to assert innocence because they will be convicted anyway.66
The modern confessions rule addresses the risk created by specific 
police interrogation strategies and techniques in a variety of ways.  First, 
the inducements aspect of the rule excludes any statement obtained by 
improper police inducements.  More specifically, any statement that is 
obtained through actual or threatened physical violence, the so-called 
third degree interrogation techniques, will usually be excluded as 
involuntary.67  In addition, an explicit offer by the police to secure lenient 
treatment in return for a statement constitutes a very strong inducement 
to confess and will, therefore, generally lead to a finding of involuntariness.68  
Less explicit offers indicating the possibility of a reduced charge or 
sentence, at least when coupled with protracted questioning, will also 
usually raise a reasonable doubt about a statement’s voluntariness. 
However, milder inducements, such as promises of psychiatric assistance 
or other forms of counseling are less likely to lead in themselves to a 
conclusion of involuntariness.69  Moreover, moral or spiritual inducements 
will rarely result in the exclusion of a statement.70  These general principles 
extend to implicit as well as explicit threats or promises.  For example, 
police use of the phrase “it would be better . . .” may result in exclusion 
if, viewed in context, it amounts to an implicit threat or promise.71  
Finally, implicit or explicit threats or promises directed against a third 
party will raise a reasonable doubt about voluntariness if there is a 
sufficiently close relationship between the individual and the third 
party.72  Ultimately, the key considerations are the existence of a quid 
 65. WHITE, MIRANDA’S WANING PROTECTIONS, supra note 22, at 211–13; Ofshe & 
Leo, Decision to Confess, supra note 52, at 1023, 1031–32, 1036–41; Ofshe & Leo, 
supra note 44, at 189, 202–03; White, Capital Cases, supra note 22, at 1015–19; White, 
Involuntary Now, supra note 22, at 2053–55; White, supra note 25, at 128.  This may 
include inventing fake technologies or procedures.  See Ofshe & Leo, Decision to 
Confess, supra note 52, at 1032–35.  For psychological research supporting this view, 
see Robert Horselenberg et al., Individual Differences and False Confessions: A 
Conceptual Replication of Kassin and Kiechel (1996), 9 PSYCHOL., CRIME & L. 1 (2003); 
Saul M. Kassin & Katherine L. Kiechel, The Social Psychology of False Confessions: 
Compliance, Internalization and Confabulation, 7 PSYCHOL. SCI. 125 (1996). 
 66. WHITE, MIRANDA’S WANING PROTECTIONS, supra note 22, at 211. 
 67. R. v. Oickle, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 3, 32, 34. 
 68. Id. at 32. 
 69. Id. at 33. 
 70. Id. at 36–37. 
 71. Id. at 36, 48–49. 
 72. Id. at 33–34. 
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pro quo offer, whether phrased as a threat or a promise,73 and a showing 
that the offer was strong enough, either individually or in combination 
with other factors, to overcome the individual’s will to remain silent.74
Second, the oppression doctrine recognizes that police use of false 
evidence may contribute to an atmosphere of oppression that renders a 
confession involuntary.75  However, even under the modern rule, conveying 
false forensic or eyewitness evidence to the individual will not by itself 
usually render a statement involuntary.  Similarly, police exaggeration of 
the reliability of evidence, including polygraph evidence, will rarely by 
itself raise issues as to voluntariness.  As the Court stated in Oickle, 
“While the police admittedly exaggerated the reliability of such devices, 
the tactic of inflating the reliability of incriminating evidence is a common, 
and generally unobjectionable one.”76  The independent police trickery 
branch of the modern rule also recognizes that a statement may be 
excluded as involuntary if the police engage in conduct that shocks the 
conscience of Canadians.  This is a very difficult standard to satisfy, which 
is apparent in the examples cited by the Court—where the interrogator 
pretends to be a chaplain, lawyer, or doctor.77  The use of exaggerated or 
fabricated evidence will rarely rise to a level that is sufficient to justify 
exclusion under this branch of the confessions rule.78  Finally, the modern 
rule requires judges to consider the impact of specific interrogation 
strategies and techniques in light of the overall circumstances of the case.  
The strength or weakness of the inducement, therefore, is not ultimately 
determinative.  As the Court stated in Oickle, 
[A] relatively minor inducement . . . may amount to an impermissible inducement if 
the suspect is deprived of sleep, heat, and clothes for several hours in the middle of 
the night. . . .  On the other hand, where the suspect is treated properly, it will take a 
stronger inducement to render the confession involuntary.79
 73. Id. at 37–38. 
 74. Id. at 37; see also R. v. Spencer, 2007 S.C.C. 11, 217 C.C.C. (3d) 353, 359–60 
(2007). 
 75. Oickle, [2000] 2 S.C.R. at 54, 58. 
 76. Id. at 14. 
 77. One can question why such statements are caught by the confessions rule 
because the accused would likely not believe that he or she was speaking to a person in 
authority.  The examples nonetheless emphasize the test’s strictness.  For an analysis of 
the limited impact of the police trickery branch of the confessions rule, see generally 
Michael C. Plaxton, Who Needs Section 23(4)? Or: Common Law Sleight-of-Hand, 10 
CRIM. REP. (6th) 236 (2003). 
 78. Oickle, [2000] 2 S.C.R. at 54, 58. 
 79. Id. at 44 (citation omitted). 




The Court’s formulation of the threats and promises component of the 
modern confessions rule therefore generally precludes police reliance on 
three of the interrogation strategies and techniques that false confession 
researchers have identified as the most likely to induce an innocent 
individual to falsely confess.  These are third degree tactics,80 promises of 
leniency in conjunction with an intense and lengthy interrogation,81 and 
threats against a third party where there is a sufficiently close relationship 
between the party and the individual.82  In contrast, in accordance with 
the existing research, more moderate and minimal threats and promises, 
particularly moral and spiritual inducements, will rarely themselves 
justify a finding of involuntariness, but must instead be assessed in light 
of all of the circumstances.83
In addition, in its reformulation of the rule the Court expressly 
acknowledged that the use of fabricated evidence can be a dangerous 
ploy.84  At the same time, it held that not all types of deception give rise 
to the same risk of inducing false confessions.85  What the Court did not 
do, and arguably should have done, is provide more guidance to judges 
and counsel by identifying more directly the types of deceptive behavior 
that are most likely to induce an individual to falsely confess.  The Court 
should also have given more serious consideration to police deception 
about the existence of forensic evidence implicating the individual, and 
whether it is truly necessary to allow the police to engage in this form of 
deception,86 particularly because recent psychological research suggests 
that this technique may be more effective in inducing confessions from 
innocent individuals than from guilty individuals.87  That is, although a 
key factor in an individual’s decision to confess is the perceived strength 
of the evidence against that individual,88 the likelihood of a confession 
appears to diminish if the individual recognizes that the evidence is 
 80. Id. at 32, 33, 34. 
 81. Id. at 32. 
 82. Id. at 33–34. 
 83. Id. at 33, 35–38. 
 84. Id. at 39. 
 85. Id. at 54. 
 86. In England, police deceit about the existence of forensic or eyewitness 
evidence is not allowed.  See R v. Mason, (1987) 3 All E.R. 481, 484–85.  In contrast, 
the United States Supreme Court does not appear to be very concerned over the use of 
this tactic.  See Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 739 (1969).  For a discussion of the merits 
of allowing police deception, see generally Miriam S. Gohara, A Lie for a Lie: False 
Confessions and the Case for Reconsidering the Legality of Deceptive Interrogation 
Techniques, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 791 (2006), and Deborah Young, Unnecessary Evil: 
Police Lying in Interrogations, 28 CONN. L. REV. 425 (1996). 
 87. See Moston et al., supra note 60, at 29–40; Mark R. Kebbell et al., Mock-
suspects’ Decisions to Confess: The Accuracy of Eyewitness Evidence is Crucial, 20 
APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 477, 483–84 (2006). 
 88. See Moston et al., supra note 60, at 34. 
IVES.DOC 11/9/2007  10:59:38 AM 
[VOL. 44:  477, 2007]  Preventing False Confessions 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 491 
 
inaccurate.89  At the very least the Court should indicate that the use of 
false forensic evidence is a particularly dangerous interrogation technique if 
it is used in combination with an express or implied promise of leniency. 
C.  Problematic Conditions of Interrogation and Detention 
Police interrogations are inherently coercive.  The individual being 
interrogated is faced with an unfamiliar and uncomfortable environment, 
isolated from the outside world and other people, and subject to the 
control of those in authority.  The basic conditions of interrogation and 
detention, in other words, create stress and exert pressure on individuals 
to speak with the police.90  Altering these conditions to increase the 
stress and pressure on the individual can increase the risk of a false 
confession. 
In particular, false confession researchers have assembled a considerable 
body of evidence that shows that the risk of a false confession increases 
with the length of the interrogation.91  Lengthy interrogations give rise to 
greater fatigue, uncertainty, confusion, fear, anxiety, stress, and despair 
on the part of the individual, all of which can increase the individual’s 
desire to bring the interrogation process to a conclusion no matter the 
cost.92  In other words, the more prolonged the interrogation, the greater 
the likelihood that the individual will become fixated on the immediate 
benefit of confessing (removal from the interrogation process) to the 
neglect of the potential long-term consequences of falsely confessing 
(conviction and imprisonment).93  As Professor White states, “No matter 
how benign the process, virtually continuous questioning by the police 
will at some point be unfair because it exerts too much pressure on the 
 89. See Kebbell et al., supra note 87, at 483–84. 
 90. Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra note 7, at 53–54.  As already noted, an 
individual’s personal characteristics and situation can either diminish or intensify the 
stress and pressure of the interrogation.  See WHITE, MIRANDA’S WANING PROTECTIONS, 
supra note 22, at 211; Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra note 7, at 56. 
 91. Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra note 7, at 53–54; White, Involuntary Now, supra 
note 22, at 2042, 2046–49; White, Miranda’s Failure, supra note 22, at 1232.  The effect 
of a lengthy interrogation may be moderated by factors such as the suspect’s age and the 
time of day that the interrogation occurs.  See Kassin, supra note 61, at 221. 
 92. Kassin, supra note 55, at 216; Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra note 7, at 52–53, 
60; Ofshe & Leo, Decision to Confess, supra note 52, at 1061. 
 93. Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra note 7, at 53. 




suspect.”94  In addition, lengthier interrogations allow the police to 
utilize a greater variety of techniques in their bid to obtain a confession. 
However, the research does not indicate the precise point at which one 
can say that the length of the interrogation has itself created a perceptively 
higher risk of false confession.  This is in part because it is not just the 
length of the interrogation that increases the potential for a false confession; 
it is also the individual’s perception about how long the interrogation 
may last.  Individuals who want to bring an end to what is perceived to 
be a mentally and physically debilitating process may decide to falsely 
confess even if they feel able to endure the questioning for another hour 
or two if they also believe that the police will be allowed to continue the 
interrogation past that point.95  All the research shows at this point is that 
most of the proven and probable cases of false confessions have 
involved interrogations of six to twenty-four hours, with an average 
length of just over sixteen hours,96 and many of them have also involved 
deception as to the strength of the evidence and promises of lenient 
treatment in exchange for a confession.97
The modern confessions rule addresses the risk created by the actual 
conditions of interrogation and detention in two respects.  First, the 
oppressions doctrine aspect of the rule expressly acknowledges that 
oppressive circumstances can contribute to a false confession and that 
oppression may, therefore, render a confession involuntary.98  In the 
Court’s words: 
If the police create conditions distasteful enough, it should be no surprise that 
the suspect would make a stress-compliant confession to escape those conditions.  
Alternately, oppressive circumstances could overbear the suspect’s will to the 
point that he or she comes to doubt his or her own memory, believes the 
relentless accusations made by the police, and gives an induced confession.99
A variety of factors may create an atmosphere of oppression, including 
ignoring the individual’s basic needs, such as sustenance, clothing, sleep, 
and medical attention; depriving the individual of access to counsel; and 
subjecting the individual to excessively aggressive, intimidating, and 
prolonged questioning.100  The Court therefore properly acknowledged 
 94. WHITE, MIRANDA’S WANING PROTECTIONS, supra note 22, at 203–04. 
 95. White, supra note 25, at 144. 
 96. Drizin & Leo, supra note 2, at 948–49; Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra note 7, at 
54; Ofshe & Leo, Decision to Confess, supra note 52, at 997–98; White, supra note 25, 
at 143–45. 
 97. White, supra note 25, at 128, 130. 
 98. R. v. Oickle, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 3, 38–39. 
 99. Id. at 38. 
 100. Id. at 39.  The court included police use of nonexistent evidence as a potential 
ground of oppression.  Id.  However, it is more properly viewed as a problematic 
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that the manner in which the police structure the interrogation environment 
and conduct the questioning helps to create the stress and pressure that 
researchers have linked to the making of false confessions.101  However, 
it would have been better if the Court had independently listed both the 
tone of questioning and the length of questioning when identifying the 
types of factors that can contribute to oppression, because each has an 
independent role to play in enhancing the risk of a false confession. 
D.  Application of the Rule 
As the above discussion demonstrates, the degree of protection that 
the modern confessions rule affords against the risk of false confessions 
depends in large measure on a contextual application of the rule.  This is 
particularly necessary to ensure that personal vulnerabilities that fall 
short of establishing cognitive incapacity under the operating mind 
doctrine are not neglected in a court’s assessment of voluntariness.  A 
further caveat is, therefore, in order.  The manner in which the Court 
applied the reformulated confessions rule in Oickle raises the concern 
that it ultimately fixated too narrowly on the individual tactics that the 
police used and failed to properly assess the overall effect of those 
techniques.102  If lower courts apply the same approach to the totality of 
circumstances test, the protective force of the modern rule may be 
significantly undermined. 
A more detailed examination of Oickle illustrates the validity of this 
concern.  According to the Court, Oickle’s statements were voluntary 
because the police conducted the interrogation in a proper manner: 
Their questioning, while persistent and often accusatorial, was never hostile, 
aggressive, or intimidating.  They repeatedly offered the accused food and drink.  
They allowed him to use the bathroom upon request.  Before his first confession 
and subsequent arrest, they repeatedly told him he could leave at any time.  In 
this context, the alleged inducements offered by the police do not raise a 
reasonable doubt as to the confessions’ voluntariness.  Nor do I find fault with 
the role played by the polygraph test in this case.  While the police admittedly 
exaggerated the reliability of such devices, the tactic of inflating the reliability 
interrogation technique, and I have therefore addressed it in that context.  See supra 
notes 48–55, 64–67 and accompanying text. 
 101. See, e.g., Richard A. Leo, False Confessions: Causes, Consequences, and 
Solutions, in WRONGLY CONVICTED:  PERSPECTIVES ON FAILED JUSTICE 36, 42–43 
(Saundra D. Westervelt & John A. Humphrey eds., 2001). 
 102. Other commentators have reached a similar conclusion.  See, e.g., DON 
STUART, CHARTER JUSTICE IN CANADIAN CRIMINAL LAW 134–43 (4th ed. 2005). 




of incriminating evidence is a common, and generally unobjectionable one.  
Whether standing alone, or in combination with the other mild inducements 
used in this appeal, it does not render the confessions involuntary.103
However, a fuller consideration of the personal and situational risk 
indicators that were present in Oickle casts doubt on this conclusion. 
In particular, the police were dealing with a sleep-deprived individual.  
The overall interrogation process was lengthy—played out over a period 
of approximately ten hours without a significant break.104  The police 
minimized the moral culpability of the offenses.  They suggested that 
Oickle would feel better if he confessed, and that admitting his problem 
would earn him the respect of his fiancée and members of the community.105  
They held out minor inducements to Oickle, suggesting that a confession 
would make it easier to address his apparent pyromania, a fact 
downplayed by the Court on the basis that there was no real quid pro quo 
offer.  They made a minor threat by indicating that in the absence of a 
confession it might be necessary to polygraph Oickle’s fiancée,106 which 
the Court minimized because it concluded that Oickle would have 
understood that his fiancée would be interviewed as an alibi witness 
rather than as a suspect.107  The police initially questioned Oickle in a 
gentle, reassuring manner so as to gain his trust and then exploited that 
trust in later questioning.  They impliedly offered to treat the fires as a 
“package deal,” which the Court downplayed on the basis that it was 
Oickle who first suggested it.108  They exaggerated the reliability of the 
polygraph test.  Although the Court is correct that none of these elements 
alone might justify exclusion based on the current state of false 
confessions research, the existence of all of these factors in one case 
ought to have raised more cause for concern about the reliability of the 
confession. 
E.  Procedural Protections 
False confessions researchers have universally concluded that a mandatory 
videotaping requirement offers considerable protection against false 
 103. Oickle, [2000] 2 S.C.R. at 14. 
 104. The polygraph examination started at about 3 p.m., and the final interrogation 
session ended at about 1:00 a.m. the next morning.  After the conclusion of the 
polygraph test, Oickle was interrogated with only short breaks for approximately six 
hours.  Three police officers were involved in the overall process.  Id. at 15–18. 
 105. Id. at 48. 
 106. Id. at 49–50. 
 107. Id. at 50–51. 
 108. Id. at 46–47. 
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confessions.109  A videotape record provides a complete, objective, and 
reviewable account of the interrogation, thereby facilitating both the 
investigative and fact-finding processes.110  This is particularly important 
given the known limitations of memory, particularly for conversation.111  
A videotape record allows investigators to focus fully on the suspect’s 
verbal and nonverbal communications, which helps to ensure investigators 
do not ignore relevant forensic information.112  The record preserves this 
information so that both investigators and counsel can review the interview 
and assess the quality and reliability of the information obtained from the 
suspect, including determining who is the actual source of the information.  
At trial, the videotape record minimizes the need to make credibility 
assessments in order to resolve disputes between the individual and the 
interviewing officers regarding what occurred in the interrogation room. 
In addition, a videotape record will reveal the individual’s general 
condition at the time of the interrogation and any specific vulnerabilities 
that are present.  It will also reveal any abuse or other improper police 
 109. See, e.g., WHITE, MIRANDA’S WANING PROTECTIONS, supra note 22, at 190–95; 
Steven A. Drizin & Marissa J. Reich, Heeding the Lessons of History: The Need for 
Mandatory Recording of Police Interrogations to Accurately Assess the Reliability and 
Voluntariness of Confessions, 52 DRAKE L.R. 619 (2004); Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra 
note 7, at 60–61; Leo & Ofshe, Consequences, supra note 3, at 494–95; Ofshe & Leo, 
Decision to Confess, supra note 52, at 1120–22; Ofshe & Leo, supra note 44, at 238; 
White, Capital Cases, supra note 22, at 1025–30. 
 110. Videotaping is not superior to audiotaping in all respects.  For example, 
research indicates that people are better able to assess the truth or falsity of a confession 
based on auditory cues alone.  See Saul M. Kassin, Christian A. Meissner & Rebecca J. 
Norwick, “I’d Know a False Confession if I Saw One”: A Comparative Study of College 
Students and Police Investigators, 29 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 211, 222 (2005).  However, 
as these researchers recognize, recommendations to videotape interrogations are intended 
to achieve multiple goals including, but not limited to, improving the ability of the fact-
finder to assess the reliability of the confession.  It may also be possible to minimize the 
impact of misleading visual cues through appropriate camera placement.  See G. Daniel 
Lassiter & Andrew L. Geers, Bias and Accuracy in the Evaluation of Confession 
Evidence, in INTERROGATIONS, CONFESSIONS, AND ENTRAPMENT, supra note 29, at 197, 
210. 
 111. See generally Deborah Davis & Richard D. Friedman, Memory for Conversation: 
The Orphan Child of Witness Memory Researchers, in 1 HANDBOOK OF EYEWITNESS 
PSYCHOLOGY:  MEMORY FOR EVENTS 3, 12–41 (Michael P. Toglia et al. eds., 2007) (analyzing 
reasons why conversational memory is deficient). 
 112. For an assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of videotaping from 
the law enforcement perspective, see William A. Geller, Videotaping Interrogations and 
Confessions (1992), reprinted in THE MIRANDA DEBATE 303, 303–13 (Richard A. Leo & 
George C. Thomas III eds., 1998) and THOMAS P. SULLIVAN, POLICE EXPERIENCES WITH 
RECORDING CUSTODIAL INTERROGATIONS (special report by Northwestern U. Sch. of Law 
Center on Wrongful Convictions, Chicago, IL), Summer 2004. 




conduct during the interrogation, thereby acting as a deterrent against 
such misconduct.  At the same time, it offers protection to interviewing 
officers against false accusations of such tactics.113  There are also few 
negative consequences to videotaping because the presence of the 
videotape does not seem to diminish the willingness of individuals to 
make confessions and may even increase the guilty pleas and conviction 
rates.114  Nor is videotaping a particularly costly practice.115  For these and 
other reasons, many law enforcement personnel favor the videotaping of 
suspect interrogations.116  However, the usefulness of a videotape in assessing 
voluntariness depends in part on the manner of taping.  In particular, an equal-
focus perspective, which includes both the interrogator and suspect, 
should be used because viewers tend to underestimate the coerciveness 
of the situation when only the suspect is visible on the tape.117  In 
addition, the full interrogation, not just the final statement of the 
individual, should be videotaped to help minimize the risk that the 
confession is the result of improper off-camera interactions between the 
police and the individual.118
The modern rule does not make the admissibility of a confession 
dependent on its being videotaped.  The Court in Oickle acknowledges 
 113. The videotapes of interrogations can also be used for training purposes to 
improve the quality of police interviewing methods.  See SULLIVAN, supra note 112, at 
18. 
 114. See Geller, supra note 112, at 311–12; Christopher Slobogin, An Empirically 
Based Comparison of American and European Regulatory Approaches to Police 
Investigation, 22 MICH. J. INT’L L. 423, 450 (2001).  It may also decrease the length of 
some interrogations. 
 115. Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra note 7, at 61. 
 116. Thomas P. Sullivan, Electronic Recording of Custodial Interrogations: 
Everybody Wins, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1127, 1128 (2005).  But such support is 
clearly not universal.  See, e.g., Steven A. Drizin & Beth A. Colgan, Let the Cameras 
Roll: Mandatory Videotaping Is the Solution to Illinois’ Problem of False Confessions, 
(2001) 32 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 337, 412–19 (2001) (recounting how police and prosecutors 
successfully opposed such an initiative in Illinois). 
 117. Lassiter & Geers, supra note 110, at 201–10.  For a recent review of the 
research on the effect of camera perspective on observer assessments of the degree of 
coercion present during videotaped interrogations, see G. Daniel Lassiter et al., 
Videotaped Confessions: Panacea or Pandora’s Box?, 28 LAW & POL’Y 192 (2006).  
The authors conclude that “the advantages associated with the videotape method—for 
example, a more detailed record of the interrogation is provided to trial participants—can 
be maintained without introducing bias if an equal-focus perspective is taken by the 
video camera.”  Id. at 204. 
 118. Admittedly, ensuring that there is a full video recording of the formal 
interrogation process does not itself eliminate the possibility that the confession is the 
result of off-camera interactions between the police and the individual.  For a thoughtful 
discussion of the problem and potential consequences of unrecorded questioning, see 
David Dixon, “A Window in the Interviewing Process?” The Audio-Visual Recording of 
Police Interrogation in New South Wales, Australia, 16 POLICING & SOC. 323, 335–342 
(2006). 
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the benefits of videotaping suspect interrogations, but then emphasizes 
that this does not mean “that non-recorded interrogations are inherently 
suspect.”119  This aspect of Oickle is unsatisfactory, particularly given 
the Court’s recognition of the many benefits of videotaping.  There 
appears to be little reason today not to impose a mandatory videotaping 
requirement.120  Ideally this should be part of a comprehensive regime 
that regulates all aspects of the interrogation process.121  Unfortunately, 
at present this seems unlikely to occur.  Therefore, at the very least the 
Court should hold that absent some valid explanation from the police, a 
nonrecorded interrogation is inherently suspect if videotape recording 
equipment was available to the officers and could have been used to 
record the interrogation.122
III.  CONCLUSION 
There is undeniably a need for further research with respect to the role 
that individual vulnerabilities and police interrogation tactics play in 
false confessions.  The Supreme Court’s reformulation of the Canadian 
confessions rule in Oickle does conform quite closely to current knowledge 
 119. R. v. Oickle, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 3, 31.  The court’s reluctance to mandate 
videotaping of suspect interrogations is surprising given its enthusiastic embrace of 
videotaping in earlier decisions.  See R. v. B. (K.G.), [1993] 1 S.C.R. 740. 
 120. The Federal Provincial Territorial Working Group on Miscarriages of Justice 
has recommended videotaping all custodial interrogations in cases involving allegations 
of significant personal violence.  See FED. PROVINCIAL TERRITORIAL HEADS OF PROSECUTIONS 
COMMITTEE WORKING GROUP, REPORT ON THE PREVENTION OF MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE 
73, 84 (2004), http://canada.justice.gc.ca/en/dept/pub/hop/ PreventionOfMiscarriagesOf 
Justice.pdf.  However, there is no compelling reason to limit the initiative to these cases.  
See Christopher Sherrin, Comment on the Report on the Prevention of Miscarriages of 
Justice, 52 CRIM. L.Q. 140, 155–65 (2007). 
 121. See generally Dixon, supra note 118 (discussing the advantages and disadvantages 
of videotaping). 
 122. The Ontario Court of Appeal initially adopted this approach, but subsequently 
retreated from it by holding it is not absolute.  Compare R. v. Moore-McFarlane, (2001) 
160 C.C.C. (3d) 493, 517 (Ont. C.A.) (finding purposely unrecorded interrogation 
inherently suspect), with R. v. Backhouse, (2005) 194 C.C.C. (3d) 1, 46–47 (Ont. C.A) 
(finding record of interrogation adequate despite lack of police attempt to make a 
recording).  Other provincial appellate courts have refused to adopt similar approaches 
on the basis that it conflicts with Oickle.  See R. v. Crockett, (2002) 170 C.C.C. (3d) 569, 
573–76 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. Ducharme, (2004) 182 C.C.C. (3d) 243, 254–57 (Man. C.A.).  
The Ontario Court of Appeal has held that where a confession is disputed, trial judges 
must instruct the jury that the failure to make a proper recording of the statement is an 
important factor to consider in deciding whether to accept the officer’s version of the 
statement.  See R. v. Wilson, (2006) 210 C.C.C. (3d) 23, 32 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Swanek, 
(2005) 28 C.R. (6th) 93, 96–97 (Ont. C.A.). 




about false confessions.  The rule affords considerable protection to 
innocent individuals.  However, it also has some significant shortcomings.  
The rule provides provincial appeal and trial courts with only some of 
the tools to recognize and exclude potentially unreliable confessions.  
Moreover, if the rule is to operate properly, both counsel and judges 
must be alert to the factors that indicate an enhanced risk of false 
confession.  In particular, counsel and judges must be cognizant of the 
fact that interrogation strategies and tactics that are unobjectionable in 
themselves, when used in combination or in relation to vulnerable 
individuals, may lead innocent individuals to falsely confess. 
Ultimately, while Oickle is an important response to the risk of false 
confessions and wrongful convictions, it should not be the Court’s final 
response.  Further reforms are not only desirable but also necessary.  In 
particular, the Supreme Court should provide further guidance to trial 
judges on the role of individual vulnerabilities in false confessions by 
specifically identifying relevant vulnerabilities and indicating how those 
vulnerabilities can impact the reliability of a confession.  In addition, the 
Court should mandate the videotaping of all interrogations.  To ensure 
the best possible protection, the interrogation should be recorded in its 
entirety and the camera should include in its focus both the interviewer 
and the suspect.  Videotaping is admittedly not a perfect solution.  As 
Oickle demonstrates, even with a videotape there may be debate over the 
exact nature of the strategies and techniques the police employed and the 
impact they had on the accused individual. 
The Court should also reconsider whether it is time to at least partially 
abandon the totality of circumstances approach to assessing voluntariness 
and, instead, begin the process of regulating more directly the conduct of 
interrogations and the permissibility of certain interrogation techniques.  
There are two key areas for potential reform: imposing limits on continuous 
interrogations by mandating regular meal and sleep breaks, and prohibiting 
the use of false forensic evidence to deceive an individual about the 
strength of the case.123  Not all commentators agree that research investigating 
the role that police interrogation techniques play in causing false confessions 
is sufficiently advanced to warrant greater regulation of these techniques.124  
However, in the face of verified evidence of false confessions leading to 
wrongful convictions, a proactive approach in this area is clearly desirable, 
 123. See, e.g., WHITE, MIRANDA’S WANING PROTECTIONS, supra note 22, at 204, 212; 
Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra note 7, at 60; see also White, Capital Cases, supra note 22, 
at 1007, 1015–25. 
 124. Sherrin, supra note 38, at 622–29.  Sherrin therefore prefers to focus on individual 
vulnerabilities.  Sherrin, supra note 120, at 156–57.  See also Laura Magid, Deceptive 
Police Interrogation Practices: How Far is Too Far?, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1168, 1193 
(2001). 
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particularly because the research confirms that law enforcement obtains 
many false confessions from individuals who do not possess psychological 
vulnerabilities.125  The Court should also consider the desirability of adding 
an additional component to the modern rule, namely a post-interrogation 
reliability analysis that focuses on the vulnerabilities of the individual, 
the probable truth of the confession, and any police improprieties in 
obtaining the statement, including conduct that may have tainted the 
statement.126  More particularly, the analysis should examine the extent 
to which the individual was independently able to describe the crime and 
crime scene, identify features of the crime or crime scene that were not 
public knowledge, and supply information that generated new evidence 
relating to the crime.127  Although false confessions cannot be entirely 
prevented, implementing these reforms, or even some of them, would 
help to reduce the overall number of false confessions, while simultaneously 

















 125. See Drizin & Leo, supra note 2, at 918–20; Gudjonsson, supra note 47, at 492, 
495, 499. 
 126. See generally Kent Roach, Unreliable Evidence and Wrongful Convictions: 
The Case for Excluding Tainted Identification Evidence and Jailhouse and Coerced 
Confessions, 52 CRIM. L.Q. 210, 228–35 (2007). 
 127. See Kassin, supra note 55, at 221; Ofshe & Leo, supra note 44, at 198–99, 
239; Ofshe & Leo, Decision to Confess, supra note 52, at 992–94, 996–97, 1118–20; 
White, Involuntary Now, supra note 22, at 2024–26; Welsh White, False Confessions in 
Criminal Cases, 17 CRIM. JUST. 5, 5–7 (2003). 
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